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Abstract
We develop and defend the thesis that the Hilbert space formal-
ism of quantum mechanics is a new theory of probability. The theory,
like its classical counterpart, consists of an algebra of events, and the
probability measures dened on it. The construction proceeds in the
following steps: (a) Axioms for the algebra of events are introduced
following Birkho¤ and von Neumann. All axioms, except the one that
expresses the uncertainty principle, are shared with the classical event
space. The only models for the set of axioms are lattices of subspaces
of inner product spaces over a eld K: (b) Another axiom due to
Solèr forces K to be the eld of real, or complex numbers, or the
quaternions. We suggest a probabilistic reading of Solèrs axiom. (c)
Gleasons theorem fully characterizes the probability measures on the
algebra of events, so that Borns rule is derived. (d) Gleasons theo-
rem is equivalent to the existence of a certain nite set of rays, with a
particular orthogonality graph (Wondergraph). Consequently, all as-
pects of quantum probability can be derived from rational probability
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assignments to nite "quantum gambles". (e) All experimental as-
pects of entanglement- the violation of Bells inequality in particular-
are explained as natural outcomes of the probabilistic structure. (f)
We hypothesize that even in the absence of decoherence, macroscopic
entanglement can very rarely be observed, and provide a precise con-
jecture to that e¤ect. We discuss the relation of the present approach
to quantum logic, realism and truth, and the measurement problem.
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1 Introduction
Discussions of the foundations of quantum mechanics have been largely con-
cerned with three related foundational questions which are often intermin-
gled, but which I believe should be kept apart:
1. A semi-empirical question: Is quantum mechanics complete? In other
words, do we have to supplement or restrict the formalism by some additional
assumptions?
2. A mathematical-logical question: What are the constraints imposed
by quantum mechanics on its possible alternatives? This is where all the
famous "no-hidden-variables" theorems belong.
3. A philosophical question: Assuming that quantum mechanics is com-
plete, what then does it say about reality?
By quantum mechanics I mean the Hilbert space formalism, including
the dynamical rule for the quantum state given by Schrödingers equation,
Borns rule for calculating probabilities, and the association of measurements
with Hermitian operators. These elements seem to me to be the core of the
(nonrelativistic) theory.
I shall be concerned mainly with the philosophical question. Conse-
quently, for the purpose of this paper the validity and completeness of the
Hilbert space formalism is assumed. By making this assumption I do not
wish to prejudge the answer to the rst question. It seems to me dogmatic
to accept the completeness claim, since no one can predict what future the-
ories will look like. At the same time I think it is also dogmatic to reject
completeness. Present day alternatives to quantum mechanics, be they col-
lapse theories like GRW [1], or non-collapse theories like Bohms [2], all su¤er
from very serious shortcomings.
However, one cannot ignore the strong philosophical motivation behind
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the search for alternatives. These are, in particular, two conceptual assump-
tions, or perhaps dogmas that propel this search: The rst is J. S. Bells
dictum that the concept of measurement should not be taken as fundamen-
tal, but should rather be dened in terms of more basic processes [3]. The
second assumption is that the quantum state is a real physical entity, and
that denying its reality turns quantum theory into a mere instrument for
predictions. This last assumption runs very quickly into the measurement
problem. Hence, one is forced either to adopt an essentially non-relativistic
alternative to quantum mechanics (e.g. Bohm without collapse, GRW with
it); or to adopt the baroque many worlds interpretation which has no collapse
and assumes that all measurement outcomes are realized.
In addition, the rst assumption delegates secondary importance to mea-
surements, with the result that the uncertainty relations are all but forgotten.
They are accepted as empirical facts, of course; but after everything is said
and done we still do not know why it is impossible to measure position and
momentum at the same time. In Bohms theory, for example, the commuta-
tion relations are adopted by at even on the level of individual processes,
but are denied any fundamental role in the theory.
My approach is traditional and goes back to Heisenberg, Bohr and von
Neumann. It takes the uncertainty relations as the centerpiece that demar-
cates between the classical and quantum domain. This position is mathemat-
ically expressed by taking the Hilbert space, or more precisely, the lattice of
its closed subspaces, as the structure that represents the "elements of reality"
in quantum theory. The quantum state is a derived entity, it is a device for
the bookkeeping of probabilities. The general outlook presented here is thus
related to the school of quantum information theory, and can be seen as an
attempt to tie it to the broader questions of interpretation. I strive to explain
in what way quantum information is di¤erent from classical information, and
, perhaps why.
The main point is that the Hilbert space formalism is a "logic of partial
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belief" in the sense of Frank Ramsey [4]. In such a logic one usually distin-
guishes between possible "states of the world" (in Savages terminology [5]),
and the probability function. The former represent an objective reality and
the latter our uncertainty about it. In the quantum context possible states of
the world are represented by the closed subspaces of the Hilbert space while
the probability is derived from the j i function by Borns rule. In order to
avoid confusion between the objective sense of possible state (subspace), and
j i- which is also traditionally called the state- we shall refer to the subspaces
as events, or possible events, or possible outcomes (of experiments). To re-
peat, my purpose is to defend the position that the Hilbert space formalism
is essentially a new theory of probability, and to try to grasp the implications
of this structure for reality.
The initial plausibility of this approach stems from the observation that
quantum mechanics uses a method for calculating probabilities which is dif-
ferent from that of classical probability theory1. Moreover, in order to force
quantum probability to conform to the classical mold we have to add objects
(variables, events) and dynamical laws over and above those of quantum the-
ory. This state of a¤airs calls for a philosophical analysis because the theory
of probability is a theory of inference and, as such, is a guide to the formation
of rational expectations.
The relation between the above stated purpose and the completeness
assumption should be stressed again. We can always avoid the radical view
of probability by adopting a non-local, contextual hidden variables theory
such as Bohms. But then I believe, the philosophical point is missed. It
is like taking Steven Weinbergs position on space-time in general relativity:
There is no non-at Riemannian geometry, only a gravitational eld dened
on a at space-time that appears as if it gives rise to geometry [9, 10, 11].
I think that Weinbergs point and also Bohms theory are justied only to
the extent that they yield new discoveries in physics (as Weinberg certainly
1 This position has been expressed often by Feynman [6], [7] . For more references, and
an analysis of this point see [8]
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hoped). So far they havent.
Je¤rey Bub was my thesis supervisor over a quarter of a century ago, and
from him I have Iearnt the mysteries of quantum mechanics and quantum
logic [12]. For quite a while our attempts to grasp the meaning of the theory
diverged, but now seem to converge again [13]. It is a great pleasure for me
to contribute to this volume in honor of a teacher and a dear friend.
2 The event structure
2.1 Impossibility, certainty, identity, and the non con-
textuality of probability
Traditionally a theory of probability distinguishes between the set of possible
events (called the algebra of events, or the set of states of Nature, or the set
of possible outcomes) and the probability measure dened on them. In the
Bayesian approach what constitutes a possible event is dictated by Nature,
and the probability of the event represents the degree of belief we attach to
its occurrence. This distinction, however , is not sharp; what is possible is
also a matter of judgment in the sense that an event is judged impossible
if it gets probability zero in all circumstances. In the present case we deal
with physical events, and what is impossible is therefore dictated by the best
available physical theory. Hence, probability considerations enter into the
structure of the set of possible events. We represent by 0 the equivalence
class of all events which our physical theory declares to be utterly impossible
(never occur, and therefore always get probability zero) and by 1 what is
certain (always occur, and therefore get probability one).
Similarly, the identity of events which is encoded by the structure also
involves judgments of probability in the sense that identical events always
have the same probability. This is the meaning of accepting a structure
as an algebra of events in a probability space. An important example is
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the following: Consider two measurements A, B, which can be performed
together, so that [A;B] = 0; and suppose that A has the possible outcomes
a1; a2; :::; ak, and B the possible outcomes b1; b2; :::; br. Denote by fA = aig
the event "the outcome of the measurement of A is ai", and similarly for
fB = bjg. Now consider the identity:
fB = bjg =
k[
i=1
(fB = bjg \ fA = aig) (1)
This is the distributivity rule which holds in this case as it also holds in all
classical cases. This means, for instance, that if A represents the roll of a
die with six possible outcomes and B the ip of a coin with two possible
outcomes, then Eq (1) is trivial. Consequently the probability of the left
hand side of Eq (1) equals the probability of the right hand side, for every
probability measure.
In the quantum mechanical context this observation has further implica-
tions. If A, B, C, are observables such that [A;B] = 0, and [B;C] = 0 but
[A;C] 6= 0. Then the identity
k[
i=1
(fB = bjg \ fA = aig) = fB = bjg =
l[
i=1
(fB = bjg \ fC = cig) (2)
holds, where c1; c2; :::; cl are the possible outcomes of C. By the rule Identical
events always have the same probability we conclude that the probabilities
of all three expressions in Eq (2) are equal. This is the principle of the non-
contextuality of probability. There is a large body of literature which attempts
to justify this principle2. For why should we apply the same probability to
fB = bjg in the A;B context as in the B;C context? If this is a good
2 The terminology was introduced in [14]. See also [15], and the criticism by Stairs [16].
In case no commitment is made regarding the lattice of subspaces as an event structure,
the non contextuality of probability requires a special justication. For example, in the
many worlds interpretation [17], [18].
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question in the quantum domain it should be an equally good question in
the classical regime. For consider Eq (1) with A representing the throw of
a die, and B the ip of a coin. Now think of two contexts: In one we just
ip the coin without rolling the die; in the other we do both. Why should
the probability of fB = bjg be the same in both contexts? (regardless of
our judgment about the dependence, or independence of the events). By
the very act of putting the outcomes of the two procedures coin ipping
and die throwing in the same probability space (the product space) we
are ipso facto assuming Eq (1) as an identity in a probability space which
implies equality of probabilities. Although routinely made, this assumption
ultimately represents an empirical judgment. Counterexamples are hard to
come by, and are usually quite contrived.
My proposal to take the Hilbert space formalism as a Ramsey type logic
of partial belief involves the same commitment. Hence, in the following I
assume that the 0 of the algebra of subspaces represents impossibility (zero
probability in all circumstances) 1 represents certainty (probability one in
all circumstances), and the identities such as Eq (1) and Eq (2) represent
identity of probability in all circumstances. This is the sense in which the
lattice of closed subspaces of the Hilbert space is taken as an algebra of
events. I take these judgments to be natural extensions of the classical case;
a posteriori, they are all justied empirically.
2.2 The axioms
In their 1936 seminal paper The logic of quantum mechanicsGarrett Birk-
ho¤ and John von Neumann [19] formulated the quantum logical program.
Their strategy was to take the following steps:
1. Identify the quantum structure which is the analogue of the event
structure of classical statistical mechanics.
2. Distill a set of principles underlying this structure and formulate them
as axioms.
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3. Show that the quantum structure is, in some sense, THE model of the
axioms.
Birkho¤and von Neumann identied the quantum event structure (which
they called "quantum logic") as the algebra of closed subspaces of a Hilbert
space. In the rest of this section I shall review the e¤orts to accomplish
steps 2 and 3 of their program, that is, begin with the axioms and generate
the structure. The elements in the structure we shall refer to as events, or
outcomes(meaning outcomes of gambles or of measurements) or sometimes
loosely as "propositions" (meaning propositions that describe the events).
Notice that the axioms below are shared by both classical and quantum
systems, with the exception of the last axiom. It should also be noted that I
do not claim that this structure is logic in the same sense that the predicate
calculus or intuitionistic logic are. (Nor do I think that Birkho¤ and von
Neumann made such a claim).3 A proposition that describes a possible event
in a probability space is of a rather special kind. It is constrained by the
requirement that there should be a viable procedure to determine whether the
event occurs, so that a gamble that involves it can be unambiguously decided.
This means that we exclude many propositions. For example, propositions
that describe past events of which we have only a partial record, or no record
at all. We also exclude undecidable mathematical propositions such as the
continuum hypothesis, and many other propositions that form a part of the
standard conception of logic. Our structure is logiconly insofar as it is the
event component of a logic of partial belief.
We use small Latin letters x; y; :::, to designate events, and denote by L
the totality of events. \ stands for intersection, [ for union, and implication
is denoted by . Finally, x? denotes the complement of x. The certain event
is denoted by 1 and the null event by 0.
These are the axioms:
3 The strong operational approach of Finkelstein [20], and Putnam [21] regarding the
logical connectives is -in the most charitable interpretation- a hidden variables theory in
disguise, see [22].
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S1 x  x.
S2 If x  y and y  z then x  z.
S3 If x  y and y  x then x = y.
S4 0  x  1
S5 x \ y  x, and x \ y  y, and if z  x and z  y then z  x \ y.
S6 x  x [ y, and y  x [ y, and if x  z and y  z then x [ y  z.
O1 (x?)? = x
O2 x \ x? = 0 and x [ x? = 1
O3 x  y implies y?  x?.
O4 Orthomodularity if x  y then y = x [ (y \ x?).
Axiom O4 is sometimes replaced by a stronger axiom:
O4* Modularity if x  z then x [ (y \ z) = (x [ y) \ z.
The axioms S1-S6, O1-O4 are true in the classical system of proposi-
tional logic or, more precisely, in the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of such a
logic, when we interpret the operations as logical connectives. The rest of
the axioms are more specic to the physical context.
H1 Atomism: If x  y then there is an atom p such that p  y and
p 
 x. Here by an atom we mean an element 0 6= p 2 L such that x  p
entails x = 0 or x = p.
H2 Covering property: For all atoms p and all elements x if x \ p = 0
then x  y  x [ p entails y = x or y = x [ p.
Atomism and the covering property are introduced to ensure that every
element of the lattice is a union of atoms. The atoms, whose existence is
guaranteed by H1, are maximally informative propositions. In the classical
case they correspond to points in the phase space (or rather, singleton subsets
of phase space); in the quantum case they correspond to one dimensional
subspaces of the Hilbert space.4
4 At a later stage von Neumann gave up the atomicity assumption. The reason has to
do with the absence of a uniform probability distribution over the closed subspaces of an
innite dimensional Hilbert space. The non-atomic structures that resulted are his famous
continuous geometries, see [23].
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H3 Completeness: if S  L then [a2Sa and \a2Sa exist.
Usually we do not assume such a strong axiom in the classical physical
case. There, the algebra of possible events is the -algebra of Lebesgue
measurable subsets of phase space, which is assumed to be closed only under
countable unions and intersections. However, axiom H3 is consistent with
the classical physical event space. It is known that in some models of set
theory every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable [24]. In such models H3
will automatically be satised for the Lebesgue algebra in phase space. This
means that no substantial di¤erence between the classical and quantum case
arises from H3.
The one single axiom that separates the quantum from the classical do-
main is
H4 Irreducibility: If z satises for all x 2 L x = (x \ z) [ (x \ z?) then
z = 0 or z = 1.
This last axiom is non-classical in the following sense: there is only one
Boolean algebra which is irreducible, the trivial algebra f0; 1g. In classical
physics the set of events is a large Boolean algebra. In fact, it is totally
reducible: for all x and all z we have x = (x \ z) [ (x \ z?).
So consider the case
x 6= (x \ z) [ (x \ z?) (3)
The intuitive meaning of Eq (3) is that the events x and z are incompat-
ible, that is, cannot be the outcomes of a single experiment. Thus, axiom
H4 is the formal expression of indeterminacy. Later we shall see how Eq(3)
entails a more familiar uncertainty relation between the probabilities of x
and z. For the sake of illustration, at this stage, consider the case in which x
and z are atoms. One implication of Eq(3) is that there are non orthogonal
atoms. So consider some measurement in which x is the actual outcome, and
the other possible outcomes are x0, x00,...etc., all orthogonal to x, so that z
is not among them. This means that after the measurement is performed we
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gain no knowledge as to whether z is the case or not. This state of a¤airs
would not be very surprising were it not for the fact that x and z are atomic
events; but in this case it seems to imply that there is no fact of the matter
as to whether z is the case or not. In other words, no certain record about
the possible outcome z is obtainable, in principle, while we perform the x
measurement. By "fact" I mean here, and throughout, a recorded fact, an
actual outcome of a measurement. Restricting the notion of fact in this
way should not be understood, at this stage, as a metaphysical thesis about
reality. It is simply the concept of factthat is analytically related to our
notion of event, in the sense that only a recordable event can potentially
be the object of a gamble. Later, in section 4.1 and in the last section we
shall come back to this issue, when we discuss the implications of the theory
to the structure of reality.
2.3 Representations and the gap
In the classical case we assume that for all x and z the following holds
x = (x \ z) [ (x \ z?). This makes the lattice L an atomic Boolean algebra.
More specically (L; 0; 1;;\;[;?) is isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of
the subsets of the set of all atoms, with the the usual Boolean operators,
with 1 the set of all atoms and 0 the null set.
The representation theorem for quantum systems is more complicated,
in this case (L; 0; 1;;\;[;?) is isomorphic to the lattice of subspaces of a
vector space with a scalar product, more specically:
1. There is a division ring K (eld whose product is not necessarily
commutative), with involutional automorphism  : K ! K, that is, for all
;  2 K  = , (+ ) =  +  , () = 
2. Theres a (left) vector space V over K.
3. Theres a Hermitian form <;>: V V ! K satisfying for all u; v; w 2
V , and ;  2 K
< u+ v; w >=  < u; v > + < v;w >,
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< u; v + w >=< u; v > + < u;w > ,
< u; v >=< v; u >,
< u; u >= 0 if and only if u = 0.
Let X  V be a subspace, let X? = fv 2 V ;< u; v >= 0 8u 2 Xg
then X? is also a subspace. If X = X?? we shall say that X is closed,
then we have V = X  X?. The representation theorem asserts that L
is isomorphic to the lattice of closed subspaces of V , in other words L '
fX  V ;X = X??g. The operation \ is just subspace intersection, and
X [ Y = (X? \ Y ?)?.
The proof of this representation theorem has essentially two parts. The
rst is the classical representation theorem for projective geometries which
goes back to the middle of the 19th century.5 An irreducible, atomic, com-
plete, lattice with a complementation ? that satises O2, and which is mod-
ular (O4*) is a projective geometry. The traditional result on the coordi-
natization of projective geometries yields the eld K and the vector space
V over it. Adding the stronger conditions on ?, in particular O4, enabled
Birkho¤ and von Neumann to derive the inner product structure on V . Note
that so far we have not introduced any explicit physical assumption, or even
a probabilistic assumption, save perhaps the indeterminacy implicit in H4.
Nevertheless, we see that the principle of superposition (that is, the fact that
V is a linear space) already presents itself.
In both the classical and the quantum cases some additional assumptions
are needed to obtain the actual models. In the quantum case the construction
will be completed if we are able to infer that K = C (the eld of complex
numbers) on the basis of a probabilistic or a physically intuitive axiom. At
least we would like to force K to be either the eld of real numbers, or the
complex numbers, or the quaternions. In these cases the inner product of a
non-zero vector by itself < u; u > is a positive real number, and Gleasons
5 By Möbius and von Staudt. For the standard geometric construction see [25]. A modern
account which stresses the algebraic aspects is in Artins classic [26]
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theorem describes the probabilistic structure. This is a gap in the argument
which has been closed to a certain extent (in the case of innite dimensional
Hilbert spaces) by the work of Solèr [27, 28]. It is hoped that a reasonable
more straightforward probabilistic or information theoretic axiom (such as a
constraint on tensor-like products) will close the gap even more tightly .
2.4 Solèrs axiom and theorem
The best result known in this direction involves a geometric axiom. It is
the celebrated theorem of Maria Pia Solèr which applies in case the lattice
is innite dimensional. The extra axiom connects a projective geometric
concept (harmonic conjugation) to the orthogonality structure. Recall that
a projective geometry is associated with the lattice in the following way:
Every atom is a point every pair of atoms generates a projective line and
every triple of atoms which are not colinear determine a projective plane.
Let x and y be two atoms then the line through them is x[ y. Suppose that
z is another atom on this line, z  x [ y, then we construct a fourth point
w  x [ y on the line which is called the harmonic conjugate of z relative
to x and y -denoted by w = H(z;x; y)- as follows (Fig 1): Let u  x [ y be
arbitrary and let v  x [ u, v 6= x; u. Denote by s = (z [ u) \ (y [ v) and
t = (x [ s) \ (z [ v) then w + H(z;x; y) + (u [ t) \ (x [ y). The harmonic
conjugate is unique (that is, independent of the choice of u and v). It is a
basic construction in projective geometry, closely related to the denitions
of the algebraic operations in the eld K (realized as the projective line).
Solers axiom may be phrased as follows:
SO If x and y are orthogonal atoms then there is z  x [ y such that
w = H(z;x; y) is orthogonal to z. In other words, H(z;x; y) = z? \ (x [ y).
Intuitively, such a z bisects the angle between x and y, that is, denesp
2 in the eld K. Solers proved
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Figure 1: Harmonic conjugation
Theorem 1 If L is innite dimensional and satises SO then K is R or
C or the quaternions.
In fact she proved a stronger result, assuming only that there is an in-
nite sequence of orthogonal atoms fxigi2N such that x = xi and y = xi+1
satisfy SO for every i = 1; 2; ::. The axiom SO may be given a probabilistic
interpretation in the spirit Ramsey as we shall see subsequently.
3 Probability Measures: Gleasons theorem,
Wondergraph and Solèrs axiom.
3.1 Gleasons theorem
Assume that the set of possible events (or possible measurement outcomes,
or propositions) is the lattice L = L(H) of subspaces of a real or complex
Hilbert space H. For simplicity, we shall concentrate on the nite dimen-
sional case. Our aim is to tie this structure to probabilities, and by doing
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so to provide further evidence that the elements of L can be seen as repre-
senting quantum events. Moreover, we shall see how the traditional features
and "paradoxes" of quantum mechanics are expressed and resolved in the
quantum probabilistic language.
First a few words to connect measurements and outcomes in the more
traditional view with the present notations. Here we shall be concerned
with measurements that have a nite set of possible outcomes. Let A be
an observable (a Hermitian operator) with n distinct possible numerical real
values (the eigenvalues of A) 1;2;:::;n. With each value corresponds an
event xi = fA = ig meaning the outcome of a measurement of A is i
We identify this event with the subspace of H spanned by the eigenvectors of
A having the eigenvalue i. The events xi are pair-wise orthogonal elements
of L. The sub lattice that x1; x2; :::; xn generate is a nite Boolean algebra
which we shall denote by B = hx1; x2; :::; xni. In case n is the dimension of
the space H each one of the events xi is an atom and the observable A is said
to be maximal.
Subsequently we shall identify any observable A with the Boolean algebra
hx1; x2; :::; xni generated by its outcomes. Note that this is an unusual identi-
cation. It means that we equate the observables A and f(A), whenever f is
a one-one function dened on the eigenvalues of A. This step is justied since
we are interested in outcomes and not their labels, and hence in such a scale
freeconcept of observable. (It is like replacing the numbers 1; 2; :::; 6 on the
face of a die by the numbers 2; 3; :::; 7 respectively). The converse is also true,
with each orthogonal set of elements x1; x2; :::; xn of L there corresponds an
observable whose eigenspaces include these elements.
Probability measures which are denable on L were characterized many
years ago in case n = dimH 3. Since every set of n orthogonal atoms
represents the outcomes of a possible measurement, and since they are all
the possible outcomes we are motivated to introduce
Denition 1 Suppose that H is of a nite dimension n over the complex or
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real eld. A real function P dened on the atoms in L is called a state (or
alternatively, a probability function) on H if the following conditions hold
1. P (0) = 0, and P (y)  0 for every element y 2 L.
2. If x1; x2; :::; xn is an orthogonal set of atoms then
Pn
j=1 P (xj) = 1.
The probability of every lattice element y 2 L is then xed since it is a
union of a set of orthogonal atoms y = x1[:::[xr, so that P (y) =
Pr
j=1 P (xj).
A complete description of the possible states is given by Gleasons theorem
[29]:
Theorem 2 Given a state P on a space of dimension  3 there is an Her-
mitian, non negative operator W on H, whose trace is unity, such that
P (x) =<
!
x;W
!
x > for all atoms x 2 L, where <;> is the inner prod-
uct, and
!
x is a unit vector along x. In particular, if some x0 2 L satises
P (x0) = 1 then P (x) =
< !x0;!x >2 for all x 2 L (Borns rule).
With the obvious conditions on convergence the above denition and
theorem generalize to the innite dimensional case. The remarkable feature
exposed by Gleasons theorem is that the event structure dictates the quan-
tum mechanical probability rule. It is one of the strongest pieces of evidence
in support of the claim that the Hilbert space formalism is just a new kind
of probability theory. The quantum structure is in this sense much more
constrained than the classical formalism. The structure of the phase space
of a classical system does not gratly restrict the type of probability measures
that can be dened on it. The probability measures which are actually used
in classical statistical mechanics are introduced mostly by at or, in any case,
are very hard to justify.
Gödel [30] said in a di¤erent context : "A probable decision about the
truth [of a new axiom] is possible ... inductively by studying its success.
Success here means fruitfulness in consequences in particular veriablecon-
sequences, i.e., consequences demonstrable without the axiom". Importing
this insight from the mathematical domain to the present physical domain
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we can see how the set of axioms for the structure, most of which are shared
with classical probability, give rise to the quantum mechanical probabilistic
structure which is otherwise left a mystery.
3.2 Finite gambles and uncertainty
So far we have dealt with the lattice L in its entirety, and with everywhere
dened probability functions. The standard conceptions of Bayesian prob-
ability theory make do, initially at least, of nite probability spaces. A
canonical situation handled by this theory is that of a gamble. In the words
of Ramsey: The old-established way of measuring a persons belief  by
proposing a bet, and seeing what are the lowest odds which he will accept,
is fundamentally sound[4]. Our gambles will likewise be nite and consist
of four steps
1. A single physical system is prepared by a method known to everybody.
2. A nite set M of incompatible measurements, each with a nite
number of possible outcomes, is announced by the bookie. The agent is
asked to place bets on the possible outcomes of each one of them.
3. One of the measurements in the setM is chosen by the bookie and the
money placed on all other measurements is promptly returned to the agent.
4. The chosen measurement is performed and the agent gains or looses
in accordance with his bet on that measurement.
There are two reasons to concentrate on nite gambles of this kind. First,
to avoid over idealization; for it is hard to imagine someone betting on the
outcomes of all possible measurements (perhaps writing an IOU for each one
of them). Secondly, and more importantly, the innite idealization blurs the
important fact that indeterminacy, and all other "strange" results associated
with quantum theory, are fundamentally combinatorial. The non-classical
behavior of the probabilities is already forced by a nite number of events
and the relations among them.
Recall that each measurement is identied with the Boolean algebra gen-
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erated by its possible outcomes in L: B = hx1; x2; :::; xmi (the xis may not
be atomic in case B is not a maximal measurement). So a gamble M is
just a set of such algebrasM = fB1;B2; :::;Bkg. We do not assume that the
gambler knows quantum theory. All she is aware of is the logical structure
which consists of these sets of outcomes. In particular, she recognizes iden-
tities, and the cases where the same outcome is shared by more than one
experiment. By acting according to the standards of rationality the gambler
will assign probabilities to the outcomes. To see this, assume that P (x j B)
is the probability assigned by the agent to the outcome x in measurement B,
where B 2M and x 2 B.
RULE 1: For each measurement B 2 M the function P ( j B) is a
probability distribution on B.
This follows directly from classical probability theory. Recall that after
the third stage in the quantum gamble the agent faces a bet on the outcome
of a single measurement. The situation at this stage is essentially the same as
a tossing of a coin or a casting of a die. Hence, the probability values assigned
to the possible outcomes of the chosen measurement should be coherent.
RULE 2: If B1;B2 2M, and y 2 B1 \ B2 then P (y j B1) = P (y j B2).
The rule asserts the non contextuality of probability, discussed in section
2.1. Suppose that B1 = hx1; x2; :::; xmi and B2 = hz1; z2; :::; zri then y 2 B1 \
B2 implies that (x1 \ y)[ :::[ (xm \ y) = y = (z1 \ y)[ :::[ (zr \ y). Rule 2,
therefore, follows from this identity between events, and the principle that
identical events in a probability space have equal probabilities.
To take the discussion closer to the lattice theoretic conception consider
nite subsets of events,    L.
Denition 2 Two propositions x and y of   are compatible if x = (x \
y) [ (x \ y?) and y = (y \ x) [ (y \ x?). A state (or probability function)  
is a real function P on   such that
a. P (x)  0 for all x 2  
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b. P (x?) = 1  P (x) whenever x; x? 2  
c. P (x [ y) + P (x \ y) = P (x) + P (y) whenever x and y are compatible
and x; y 2  .
Such probability functions dened over nite subsets of events in the
lattice are the subject of our study. Note that we do not put any requirements
on such Ps apart from the three conditions a, b, c, in the denition. In
particular, probability functions on   are not constrained to be induced by
quantum mechanical states. The relation between this denition and the
gambles introduced previously is clear. Given any gamble M as above the
set of events is   = B1 [ B2 [ ::: [ Bk  L. Every probability function which
follows RULE 1 and RULE 2 satisfy the conditions a, b, c, in denition 2.
As a simple example which demonstrates an uncertainty relation consider
the following quantum gambleM consisting of seven incompatible measure-
ments (Boolean algebras), each generated by its three possible atomic out-
comes:
hx1; x2; y2i ; hx1; x3; y3i ; hx2; x4; x6i ; hx3; x5; x7i ;
hx6; x7; yi ; hx4; x8; y4i ; hx5; x8; y5i
Note that some of the outcomes are shared by two measurements, these are
denoted by the letter x. The other outcomes each belong to a single algebra,
and are denoted by a y. The orthogonality relations among the generators are
depicted in the orthogonality graph in Fig(2), which is a part of Kochen and
Speckers famous "cats cradle"[31]. Each node in the graph represents an
outcome, two nodes are connected by an edge if, and only if the corresponding
outcomes belong to a common Boolean algebra (measurement); each triangle
represents the generators of one of the Boolean algebras.
The probabilities of each triple of outcomes of each measurement should
sum to 1, for example, P (x4) + P (x8) + P (y4) = 1. There are altogether
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Figure 2: Cats cradle
seven equations of this kind. Combining them with the fact that probabil-
ity is non-negative it is easy to prove that the probabilities assigned by our
rational agent should satisfy P (x1) + P (x8)  32 [15]. This is an example
of an uncertainty relation, a constraint on the probabilities assigned to the
outcomes of incompatible measurements. In particular, if the system is pre-
pared in such a way that it is rational to assign P (x1) = 1 then the rules of
quantum gambles force P (x8)  12 .
This result is a special case of a more general principle given by [32, 33]
Theorem 3 (logical indeterminacy principle) Assuming dimH  3; let x
and y be two incompatible atoms in the lattice L = L(H), that is, x 6=
(x \ y) [ (x \ y?). Then there is a nite set    L(H) with x; y 2   such
that every state P on   satises P (x) + P (y) < 2. In fact we have more:
P (x); P (y) 2 f0; 1g if and only if P (x) = P (y) = 0.
This theorem explains the sense in which axiomH4 -the axiom of irreducibility-
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expresses indeterminacy. This axiom asserts that for every non trivial x there
is a y such that x 6= (x\ y)[ (x\ y?). By the logical indeterminacy princi-
ple the probability value of at least one of the events x or y must be strictly
between zero and one, unless they both have probability zero. Moreover,
this fact is already forced by the relation between x, y and nitely many
other events. Remember also that H4 is the only axiom (except SO) that
distinguishes between the classical and quantum structures.
3.3 Wondergraph
The previous theorem is typical in the sense that all features of quantum
probability, even the quantitative features, can be forced by the logical re-
lations among nitely many events. This follows from a construction of a
particular nite set of atoms in R3 which, together with the orthogonality
relations among its elements will be called the Wondergraph.
Let us introduce rst the notion of a frame function which generalizes
the concept of a state
Denition 3 Let    L(H) be a set of atoms of L(H) where dimH = n. A
frame function on   is a real function f on   such that all orthogonal sets
of atoms x1; x2; :::; xn in   satisfy
Pn
j=1 f(xj) = C; where C is a constant.
Consider the case of R3 the smallest space to which Gleasons theorem
applies. Let  !e1 = (1; 0; 0),  !e2 = (0; 1; 0) and  !e3 = (0; 0; 1) be the standard
basis in R3 and
 !
bij =
1p
2
( !ei +  !ej ), 1  i < j  3. Denote by ei and bij the
one dimensional subspaces along these vectors. The following theorem turns
out to be equivalent to Gleasons theorem [33]:
Theorem 4 (Wondergraph theorem) For every atom z 2 L(R3) there is a
nite set of atoms 
(z)  L(R3) such that ei; bij; z 2 
(z) and such that every
frame function f on 
(z) which satises f(ei) = f(bij) = 0, and jf(x)j  1
for all x 2 
(z) necessarily also satises jf(z)j  1
2
. Moreover, j
(z)j, the
number of elements of 
(z), is the same for all z.
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Note that the condition f(ei) = 0; 1  i  3 for the frame function
f on 
(z) entails that f(x) + f(x0) + f(x00) = 0 for all orthogonal triples
x; x0; x00 2 
(z). To see why Wondergraph theorem entails Gleasons theorem
consider rst
Lemma 5 Gleasons theorem for R3is true if and only if every bounded frame
function f dened on the atoms of L(R3) which satises f(ei) = f(bij) = 0
is identically zero.
The proof of the lemma is straightforward. It follows from the fact that
the quadric form h !x ;A !x i induced by a self adjoint operator A on R3 is
uniquely determined by the six numbers h !ei ; A !ei i,
D !
bij; A
 !
bij
E
. Now, to see
how Gleasons theorem follows from Wondergraph let f be a bounded frame
function dened on the atoms of L(R3) which satises f(ei) = f(bij) = 0.
Normalize f so that jf(x)j  1 for all x. Take z to be arbitrary, then the
restriction of f to 
(z) is a frame function on 
(z) and therefore jf(z)j 
1
2
. Suppose the atoms of 
(z) are x1; :::; xs and consider the set 
1(z) =Ss
j=1
(xj). The restriction of f to 
1(z) is a frame function on each one
of the 
(xj)s. Hence, jf(xj)j  12 for all xj 2 
(z) and therefore jf(z)j 
1
4
. Iterating this process we get that jf(z)j becomes as small as we wish.
Since z is arbitrary the theorem follows. Gleasons theorem for any Hilbert
space follows from the case of R3, as Gleason himself showed. Another way
to extend the theorem from R3 to higher real or complex dimensions is to
construct Wondergraphs in every (nite) dimension; which can be done once
the three dimensional real case is given.
The proof that Gleasons theorem entails the existence of Wondergraph
is based on model theory. As a part of the proof one also concludes that
there is a known algorithm to construct Wondergraph. The setback is that
this algorithm runs very slowly (it is, in fact , the decision algorithm for the
theory of real closed elds, which in the worst case runs in doubly exponential
time). Thus we pose a
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Problem 1 Construct Wondergraph explicitly.
Wondergraph allows one to reduce all the interesting quantum phenomena
to relations among nitely many events. This follows from:
Corollary 6 Given a nite set of atomic events  0 and a real number " > 0
there is a nite set of atoms   such that
a.  0   , the number of elements j j of   depends on " and on j 0j
but not on the elements of  0.
b. If P is a state on   then there is a quantum state W (non negative
Hermitian operator with trace 1) such thatP (x)  < !x;W!x > < " for all x 2  0
c. There is an algorithm to generate   given  0 and ".
For many of the famous "paradoxes" of quantum mechanics explicit con-
structions of the required nite set   exist [15, 32, 33]. These include the
EPR-Bell argument, the Kochen and Specker theorem, and also generaliza-
tions of Kochen and Specker to any given nite number of colors.
On a more fundamental level the importance of these results lies in the
way probabilities are associated with L, the algebra of all the possible out-
comes of all possible measurements. Remember that in the epistemic concep-
tion of probability a fundamentally soundmethod of measuring a persons
belief is by proposing a bet and seeing what are the lowest odds he will
accept. In order to t the innite structure L into this view of probabil-
ity (or any other of the standard Bayesian accounts) we consider only nite
segments of L and the probability functions denable on them. These are
the quantum gambles considered above. They are the equivalents of classi-
cal gambles with dice, roulettes and cards. Some real experiments involve
arrangements which are like our gambles: A laboratory device is prepared
in such a way that it can perform either one of a few incompatible mea-
surements. Then, the experiment which is actually performed is chosen at
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random. This gives quantum probability an "operational" avour and, hope-
fully removes some of the mystery connected with it, typically expressed by
words like "interference" and "superposition".
Another way to see this point is to think about the classical propositional
calculus. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra on countably many generators
gives us all the expressive power we need as far as the propositional connec-
tives are concerned. However, in practice we interpret (assign truth values)
only to nite subsets. By analogy, if we take L as representing a "syntax" en-
compassing symbols for all possible outcomes of all possible measurements,
then the "semantics" is the assignment of probability values to nite sec-
tions of L. Gleasons theorem, in its Wondergraph version, implies that this
"semantics" is, in fact, complete:
Corollary 7 (Completeness) Suppose that an agent assigns probability val-
ues P (x) to the elements x of a nite  0  L, in a way that contradicts all
possible quantum assignments. Then there is a nite     0, such that P
cannot be extended from  0 to  . Hence, in a larger gamble the agent can be
shown to be irrational.
3.4 Solèrs axiom revisited
Let us return to our axiomatic system and the axiom that closes the gap.
Recall that Solèrs axiom asserts that for every pair of orthogonal atoms x
and y there is another atom z in the plane they span, which bisects the angle
between x and y. More formally: H(z;x; y), the harmonic conjugate of z
with respect to x and y, is orthogonal to z.
Assume that L is innite dimensional. In this case Solèrs theorem, when
coupled with Gleasons theorem, implies that for any (globally dened) state
P on L and atoms x; y 2 L, if P (x) = 1 and P (y) = 0 then necessarily x?y,
and there is an atom z  x [ y such that P (z) = 1
2
. In other words, there is
a precise interpolation between probabilities zero and one.
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The axiomatic systems of Bayesian probability theory typically include
axioms which imply interpolation of probability values. The most famous (or
infamous) one is Ramseys axiom on the existence of an "ethically neutral"
proposition whose probability is one half (axiom 1 in Ramseys system [4]).
The axiom allows Ramsey to construct his theory of utilities (or "values",
in his terminology). Savage [5], who wanted to avoid notions like "ethical
neutrality", nevertheless also needs an interpolation principle for probabili-
ties, and assumes the existence of arbitrarily rened partitions. This implies
that one can obtain propositions with probabilities arbitrarily close to any
rational in the interval [0; 1].
I propose to read Solèrs axiom as a probability interpolation axiom; or
at any rate to reformulate or replace it by a direct axiom about probabilities.
This, however, cannot be straightforward. We are not even guaranteed that
a globally dened state exists on L in the rst place. However, we can use the
fact that certain nite orthogonality graphs such as   of theorem 3 force any
state dened on them to interpolate probability values between zero and one.
This is our logical indeterminacy principle which expresses probabilistically
the basic principle that di¤erentiates the quantum event structure from the
classical one. Now, we can turn the tables and assert axiomatically that
orthogonality relations like those in   are realizable in L. This assertion
indirectly expresses the indeterminacy relations in their probabilistic sense.
Here, for example, is how this can be done:
Consider L(R3) and the rays x, z through the vectors: !x = (1; 0; 0), and
 !z = (1; 1; 0) respectively. Let   =  (x; z)  L(R3) be the nite subset of
rays guaranteed in theorem 3 (and explicitly constructed in [31, 32]). This
means that if P is a state on   with P (x) = 1 then 0 < P (z) < 1. Now,
consider the rays in   and their orthogonality relations abstractly, that is, as
a graph, which we shall also denote  . A candidate to replace Solèrs axiom
can then be formulated as :
SO* Let x, y, x0 2 L be three orthogonal atoms then there is z  x [ y,
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such that the graph  (x; z) is realizable in x [ y [ x0.
There is a way to construct the graph   which will make SO* obviously
stronger than the original SO. To do this simply add to   the rays (and
orthogonality relations) which force the relation H(z;x; y) ? z. In the nota-
tions of section 2.4, this means adding rays u; v; s; t and also the rays which,
in the space x[ y [ x0, are orthogonal to the planes x[ u, z [ u, y [ v, x[ s,
z [ v, u [ t . But this is cheating, all it shows is that there is a nite graph
that forces Solèrs axiom simultaneously with uncertainty. In order to make
the axiom more acceptable one has to solve
Problem 2 Find the minimal   that forces logical indeterminacy and that
allows the proof of Solèrs theorem (and even, perhaps, improves it to include
nite dimensional cases).
Another possible candidate -analogous to Savages axiom on the existence
of arbitrarily ne partitions- is the following:
SO** Let z 2 L; then the Wondergraph 
(z) is realizable in any three
dimensional subspace of L that includes z.
The restriction of the graphs we have used to those realizable in R3 is not
essential. It may very well be that a more natural candidate for our   or 

exists, e.g., in C4.
4 Probability: Range and Classical Limit
We turn now to the explanatory power of our analysis. The "logic of partial
belief" provides straightforward probabilistic, or even combinatorial deriva-
tions of a variety of phenomena for which alternative approaches require
complicated ad-hoc dynamical explanations. We shall consider two central
examples: the rst is the EPR paradox and the violation of Bell inequality,
and the second is the measurement problem. In particular, we shall discuss
the way macroscopic objects can be handled in this framework.
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4.1 Bell Inequalities
The phenomenological di¤erence between classical and quantum probability
is most dramatic when quantum correlations associated with entangled states
are concerned. Let us recall what the classical probabilistic analysis of the
situation is: A pair of objects is sent from the source, one in Alices direction,
one in Bobs direction. Alice can perform either one of two measurements on
her object; she can decide to detect the event x1 or its absence (which means
detecting the event x?1 ). Alternatively, she can decide to check the event x2
or x?2 . So each of these measurements has two possible outcomes. Similarly,
Bob can test for y1 or use a di¤erent test to detect y2. Assuming nothing
about the physics of the situation, and just considering the outcomes we get
the following possible logical combinations expressed in the truth table:
x1 x2 y1 y2 x1 \ y1 x1 \ y2 x2 \ y1 x2 \ y2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
It is the truth table of four propositional variables x1; x2; y1; y2 and four
(out of the six) pair conjunctions, so it has 16 rows, three of them shown
explicitly. Each row represents a possible state of a¤airs regarding the possi-
ble outcomes where 1 indicates that the event occurs. Now, suppose that we
were to bet on the outcomes. There are, of course many ways to do this, but
they all have to conform with the canons of rationality. The only constraint
here is that each one of the 16 possibilities will be assigned a non-negative
probability, and the sum of these probabilities be 1. To give this fact a geo-
metric interpretation consider each one of the 16 rows in the truth table as a
vector in an 8 dimensional real space, then the vector of probabilities (writing
xiyj for xi \ yj)
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Figure 3: Correlation polytope
P = (P (x1); P (x2); P (y1); P (y2); P (x1y1); P (x1y2); P (x2y1); P (x2y2))
lies in the convex hull of these 16 vectors, which is a correlation polytope in
R8 with the 16 truth values as vertices shown schematically in Fig(3).
The facets of the polytope, are given by linear inequalities in the proba-
bilities, in this case the non-trivial inequalities have the form
 1  P (x1y1) + P (x1y2) + P (x2y2)  P (x2y1)  P (x1)  P (y2)  0 (4)
They are called Clauser-Horne inequalities6, they are among what is gener-
ally known as Bell inequalities. Remarkably, in the mid 19-century George
Boole considered the most general form of the constraints on the values of
probabilities of events that can be derived from the logical relations among
them. He proved that these constraints have the form of linear inequalities in
6 The inequalities were derived in [34]. The su¢ ciency of the inequalities is due to Fine
[35]. The polyhedral structure, its relation to logic, and its generalizations are discussed
in [22, 36].
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the probabilities. Paraphrasing Kant he called such constraints Conditions
of Possible Experience7.
So far we have been concentrating on the classical picture. What is the
quantummechanical analysis? Again, we shall make no physical assumptions
beyond those which are given by the axioms of the event structure. With
the two particles we associate a Hilbert space of the form H 
H, where in
case the objects are spin-1
2
particles, dimH = 2. The relevant lattice is thus
L = L(H 
 H). The element of L corresponding to the event x1 is a two
dimensional subspace of the form a1 
 1 where a1 2 L(H) and 1 is the unit
in L(H). Similarly, the event corresponding to the outcome y1 on Bobs side
is 1 
 b1, and likewise for the other cases. The event corresponding to the
measurement of x1 on Alices side and y1 on Bobs side is just the intersection:
(a1 
 1) \ (1
 b1) = a1 
 b1
Note also that ai
 1, and 1
 bj are compatible. Now, to the eight outcomes
a1 
 1; a2 
 1; 1
 b1; 1
 b2; a1 
 b1; a1 
 b2; a2 
 b1; a2 
 b2;
correspond an 8 dimensional vectors of probability values
P = (P (a1
1); P (a2
1); P (1
b1); P (1
b2); P (a1
b1); P (a1
b2); P (a2
b1); P (a2
b2));
where P is any probability assignment to the elements of L(H 
H). When
7 In [37], see also [8]. The parody of Kant is intended, I think. In his classic The Laws of
Thought Boole writes: "Now what has been said,..., is equally applicable to many other
of the debated points in philosophy; such, for instance, as the external reality of space
and time. We have no warrant for resolving these into mere forms of the understanding,
though they unquestionably determine the present sphere of our knowledge" ([38], page
418, my emphasis). So, in the end the joke is on Boole.
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we vary P and the subspaces ai, bj, we see that the quantum range is larger
than the classical one, and some points lie outside the classical polytope (Fig
3), that is, they violate one of the facet inequalities of Clauser and Horne.
From the point of view developed so far this consequence is natural and
follows from the event structure of quantum mechanics via Gleasons the-
orem. We also know from corollary 10 that a violation of a Clauser-Horne
inequality can already be depicted in a nite gamble (an explicit construction
can be found in [15]). Altogether, in our approach there is no problem with
locality and the analysis remains intact no matter what the kinematic or the
dynamic situation is; the violation of the inequality is a purely probabilis-
tic e¤ect. Notice that we are just using the quantum event space notion of
intersection between (compatible) outcomes: (a1 
 1) \ (1 
 b1) = a1 
 b1,
as we have used the intersection in the classical event space. The deriva-
tion of Clauser-Horne inequalities, indeed of many of Booles conditions, is
blocked since it is based on the Boolean view of probabilities as weighted av-
erages of truth values. This, in turn, involves the metaphysical assumption
that there is, simultaneously, a matter of fact concerning the truth values of
incompatible propositions such as x1 = a1 
 1 and x2 = a2 
 1.
Recall that in section 2.2 we restricted "matters of fact" to include only
observable records. Our notion of fact is analytically related to that of
event in the sense that a bet can be placed on x1 only if its occurrence,
or failure to occur, can be unambiguously recorded. However, this leaves
open a metaphysical question: Given that x1 occurred, what is the status of
x2 for which no observable record can exist? Our axioms are not designed
to rule out the possibility that x2 has a truth value which we do not know.
Initially our approach was agnostic with respect to facts which leave no trace.
However, as the above analysis shows, assigning truth values to x2 and x1
simultaneously is untenable. In other words, it is prohibited by the axioms a
posteriori.8 I believe that Bohr deserves the credit for this insight, although
8 This also follows from the logical indeterminacy principle (theorem 3) or the (weaker)
Kochen and Speckers theorem [33].
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his arguments fall short of establishing it.
We should also recall that there are alternatives to quantum mechan-
ics in which the violations of the Clauser-Horne inequalities have non-local
dynamical origins. However, from our perspective the commotion about lo-
cality can only come from one who sincerely believes that Booles conditions
are really conditions of possible experience. Since these conditions are just
properties of the classical intersection of events, their violation must indi-
cate that something is not kosher with the measurements, that is, the choice
of a measurement on one side may be correlated with the outcome on the
other. But if one accepts that one is simply dealing with a di¤erent notion
of probability, then all space-time considerations become irrelevant.
4.2 The BIG measurement problem, the small one,
and the classical limit.
There are two measurement problemsThe BIG problem, which is illusory,
and the small problem which is real and concerns the quantum mechanics of
macroscopic systems. The BIG problem concerns those who believe that the
quantum state is a real physical state which obeys Schrödingers equation in
all circumstances. In this picture a physical state in which my desk is in a
superposition of being in Chicago and in Jerusalem is a real possibility; and
similarly a superposed alive-dead cat. In fact the linearity of Schrödingers
equation implies that (decoherence notwithstanding) it is easy to produce
states of macroscopic objects in superposition- which seems to contradict
our experience, and sometimes, as in the cat case, does not even make much
sense.
In our scheme quantum states are just assignments of probabilities to
possible events, that is, possible measurement outcomes. This means that
the updating of the probabilities during a measurement follows the Von
Neumann-Lüders projection postulate and not Schrödingers dynamics. In-
deed, the projection postulate is just the formula for conditional probability
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that follows from Gleasons theorem. So the BIG measurement problem does
not arise. In particular, the cat in the Schrödinger thought experiment is not
superposed, but is rather cast in the unlikely role of a particle spin detector.
Schrödingers equation governs the dynamics between measurements; it dic-
tates the way probability assignments should change over time in the absence
of a measurement. The general shape of the Schrödingers equation is not a
mystery either; the unitarity of the dynamics follows from the structure of
L(H) via a theorem of Wigner [39], in its lattice theoretic form [40]. How-
ever, these remarks do not completely eliminate the measurement problem
because in our scheme quantum mechanics is also applicable to macroscopic
objects.
So suppose that x is one of the rays in the cats Hilbert space correspond-
ing to a living cat. Let y be one of the atoms corresponding to a dead cat
so that x?y. By Solèrs axiom there is an atom z  x [ y which bisects
the angle between x and y. Does this mean that we are back with the BIG
measurement problem? The answer is No; remember that z is not a state
of the system, it is a possible measurement outcome. It is a mistake to think
that by merely following Schrödingers experiment we are "observing" the
event z, or something like it. Obviously we are not, we either see an x-like
event, a live cat, or a y-like dead cat event. In order to "see" z we have to
devise and perform a measurement such that z is one of its eigenspaces. For
reasons that will be explained below, with all probability this is impossible.
But even agreeing that performing such a measurement is impossible,
we can surely think about operators for which z is an eigenspace, say the
projection on z. So let us imagine what one will see when one performs this
measurement; what does the event z look like? Presumably, the imagined
measuring device is a huge piece of very complicated equipment, because in
all likelihood the measurement of the projection on z involves manipulating
individual cat particles. In the end, however, there is a dial with two possible
readings 0 and 1, and z is just the event that the dial reads 1. By Lüders
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rule the state of the cat after the measurement -assuming that z was the
outcome- is the projection on z. The quantum state is not a physical object,
it is a representation of our state of knowledge, or belief. The projection on
z represents an extremely complex assignment of probabilities to all possible
events in a Hilbert space of v 1025 particles, an intractable business. One
thing is clear, though, there is complete uncertainty about the cat being dead
or alive P (x) = P (y) = 1
2
, and of course P (x [ y) = 1.
Ignorance aside, is it not the case that now, after the measurement, there
is a matter of fact about the cat being dead or alive? Well, No! As in all
such circumstances we cannot say that there is a fact regarding this matter.
It is impossible in principle to obtain a record concerning the cat being alive
or dead simultaneously with the z-measurement. There is no fundamental
di¤erence between the present case and EPR, meaning that we cannot con-
sistently maintain that the proposition the cat is alivehas a truth value.
But the devil is in the details; there is no way to tell from our completely
schematic description what is going on in the laboratory. Consequently, there
is no way to tell what is the biological state of the cat. It is only after we
have mastered the details of the measuring process that we can understand
the exact sense in which no record of x or of y is obtainable.
4.3 The Weak Entanglement Conjecture
The small measurement problem is the question why we do not routinely
observe events like z for macroscopic objects. More precisely why is it hard
to observe macroscopic entanglement, and what are the conditions in which
it might be possible? One answer which is certainly valid is decoherence-
meaning that it is extremely hard to isolate large pieces of matter and equip-
ment from environmental noise. Decoherence is a dynamical process and its
exact character depends on the physics of the situation. I would like to point
a possible more fundamental, purely combinatorial reason which is an out-
come of the probabilistic structure: The entanglement of an average ray in
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a multiparticle Hilbert space is very weak. To make this intuition precise we
have to quantify entanglement, and dene what we mean by average ray.
To make the discussion simpler we shall concentrate on qbits. So our
Hilbert space is composed of n copies of the two dimensional complex Hilbert
space Hn= C2
C2
 :::
C2, and dimHn = 2n. An atom s 2 L(Hn) is called
separable if it has the form s = x1
 x2
 :::
 xn with xi 2 L(C2), otherwise
an atom is called entangled. Also, we shall call the projections on separable
(entangled) rays, separable (entangled, respectively) pure states. We keep
the letter s to designate separable atoms, and denote by S  L(Hn) the set
of all separable atoms. As usual if x 2 L(Hn) is a ray (atom), we shall denote
by  !x a unit vector along it.
Now, suppose that we want to observe an entangled atom x. More pre-
cisely, we want to obtain a positive proof that it is indeed entangled. To do
this we have to design a measurement that will distinguish the ray x from
all the separable atoms s 2 S. A Hermitian operator that does this always
exists, and will be called an entanglement witness for x, or in short, a wit-
ness. The normalization of witnesses is a matter of convention and for our
purpose we shall use the following:
Denition 4 An Hermitian operatorW on Hn= C2
C2
:::
C2 (n copies)
is called an entanglement witness if it satises
supfjh !s ;W !s ij ; s 2 Sg = 1
while
kWk = supfjh !x ;W !x ij ; x 2 L(Hn)g > 1:
So a witness is an observable whose expectation on every separable state
is bounded between  1 and 1, while it has an eigenvalue that is larger than
1 in absolute value. Any one-dimensional eigenspace x corresponding to this
eigenvalue is obviously entangled. Denote byWn the set of all entanglement
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witnesses on Hn. One way to estimate how much a given x 2 L(Hn) is
entangled is to calculate
E(x) = supfjh !x ;W !x ij ; W 2 Wng (5)
A witness W at which the value E(x) obtains is the best witness for the
entanglement of x. If we allow that every measurement involves errors then
the larger E(x) is, the more likely we are to actually observe it. The good
news is that there are rays x 2 L(Hn) such that E(x) =
p
2n. These corre-
spond to the the maximally entangled states, the so-called generalized GHZ
states9. However, it seems that such rays become more and more rare as
n increases. To formulate this intuition precisely, let n be the normalized
uniform (Lebesgue) measure on the unit sphere of Hn. Then we
Conjecture 1 There is a universal constant C > 0 such that
n
n !x ; E(x) > Cpn log no! 0 as n!1 (6)
A similar result has been established for a large family of witnesses that
for each n contains 22
n
witnesses, and which include those that give the best
estimation for the GHZ states [44]; hence the conjecture.
I think the conjecture, if true, concerns our ability to observe macroscopic
entanglement. There are two types of macroscopic or mesoscopic rays whose
entanglement might be witnessed, and the conjecture concerns the second
case:
1. There may be relatively rare cases in which the entanglement witness
happens to be a thermodynamic observable, that is, an observable whose
measurement does not require manipulation of individual particles but only
the observation of some global property of the system. There are some indi-
cations that this may be the case for some spin chains and lattices [45].
9 See Mermin [41]. The witnesses that provide the maxumum value have a close relation
to the facets of the correlation polytope for this case, see [42, 43].
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2. Cases of very strong entanglement, like GHZ, which do require many
manipulations of individual particles to be observed; however, the value of
E(x) is large enough to give signicant results that rise above the measure-
ment errors. If we assume that the measurement errors are independent,
then the total expected error grows exponentially with the number of par-
ticles that are manipulated. So, in general, one expects that only xs for
which E(x) is exponential in the number of manipulated particles could yield
a signicant outcome. The conjecture proposes that the proportion of such
x s is low.
To sum up: the answer to the question "why dont I see chairs in su-
perposition" is twofold, decoherence surely, but even if we could turn it o¤,
there is the combinatorial possibility that "seeing" something like this is
nearly impossible. All this, luckily, does not prevent the existence of exotic
macroscopic superpositions that can be recorded.
5 Measurements
In this paper, all we have discussed is the Hilbert space formalism. I have
argued that it is a new kind of probability theory that is quite devoid of
physical content, save perhaps the indeterminacy principle which is built
into axiom H4. Within this formal context there is no explication of what a
measurement is, only the identication of "observables" as Hermitian opera-
tors. In this respect the Hilbert space formalism is really just a syntax which
represents the set of all possible outcomes, of all possible measurements. It
is analogous to the mathematical concept of a probability space, in which
certain subsets are identied as events. However, the mathematical theory
of probability itself does not tell us the nature of the connection between
these formal creatures and real events in the world.
But even before a connection is made between the formal and physical
sense of measurement I think there is an interesting philosophical problem
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here. Our formalism seems to be consistent: there is a possible world where
measurements and their outcomes behave in the way described above. This
would not have been a serious problem if the classical theory of probability
were not conceived as a priori in some sense. But the theory of probability
is a part of what we take as our theory of inference, hence the term logic
of partial belief. As such it is also a ground for the formation of rational
expectations. Therefore, the fact that there is a consistent alternative poses
a problem similar to the problem that non-Euclidean geometry raised even
before general relativity. What should we make of a world in which Booles
conditions of possible experience are violated for no reason other than the
structure of probabilities described here?
What is real in the quantum world? Firstly, there are objects- particles
about which the theory speaks- which are identied by a set of parameters
that involve no uncertainty, and can be recorded in all circumstances and
thus persist through time and context [46]. Among them are the rest mass,
electric charge, baryonic number, etc. The other part of quantum reality
consists of events, that is, recordings of measurements in a very broad sense
of the word. Now, one has to distinguish between measurements on the one
hand and interactions between material objects on the other. The latter are
best described in the Heisenberg picture: There is a time dependent inter-
action Hamiltonian H(t) which, like any other observable, denes at every
moment t a set of possible outcomes, one of the outcomes would obtain if
H(t) were measured. If, in addition, we have formed a belief about the state
of the system at time t = 0 (as a result of a previous measurement, say) we
automatically have a probability distribution over the set of all possible out-
comes of all possible measurements at each t. So each interaction constrains
the set of possible outcomes in a certain specic way, and the question which
interactions can actually be executed is an empirical question, to be tested
by observing the outcomes and their distributions. Measurements are not
interactions in this sense; although in the broad description of an experiment
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there is usually an interaction leading to the measurement.
It is impossible to give a precise denition of all the physical processes
that deserve the name measurement ; just as it is not possible to dene the
term event to which the theory of probability can be applied. Even a non-
contextual denition of a singular concrete measurement is hard to provide;
in this sense measurement outcomes are events "under a description", as
philosophers say. Broadly speaking, a measurement is a process in which
a material system M , prepared in a specic way, records some aspect of
another system S, a recording that e¤ects a permanent change in M , or at
least one that lasts long enough. The outcomes to which we have referred
throughout the paper are such recordings. Probably the best way to describe
measurements is in informational terms. The information recorded by a
measurement is systematic in the sense that a repeated conjunction of M
and S yields the same set of results, and the frequency distribution over
the set of results stabilizes in the long run. Of the same importance is the
information that is lost during a measurement, the outcome that we could
have obtained if any other measurement M 0 were performed instead of M
[47].
This description is broad enough to include the change that photons im-
print on the receptors of the retina; it also includes the change caused by a
proton hitting a rock on the dark side of the moon. There is nothing specif-
ically human about measurements, nor does M have to be associated with
a macroscopic system. What constitutes a "measuring device" cannot be
determined beyond this broad description. However, there is a structure to
the set of events. Not only does each and every type of measurement yield a
systematic outcome; but also the set of all possible outcomes of all measure-
ments -including those that have been realized by an actual recording- hang
together tightly in the structure of L(H). This is the quantum mechanical
structure of reality.
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